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Scholars who study the rhetoric of health and medicine are deeply 
invested in questions of risk and representation. As researchers 
working in this area, we investigate the ways in which health and 
illness are constructed, and we question how these constructions 
shape the practices of healthcare workers and the lived experiences 
of patients. In the summer of 2015 a number of rhetoricians of 
health and medicine gathered at the Rhetoric Society of America’s 
(RSA) Summer Institute to discuss the direction of the discipline 
and to reflect on current and future projects. As part of that 
workshop, many of us held an extended discussion about Ebola and 
the outbreak that had begun a year earlier in West Africa. Several of 
us who participated in the workshop—Jennifer Scott, Kristin 
Kondrlik, Heidi Lawrence, and Susan Popham—research vaccine 
rhetoric, so our conversation centered on the many calls to invest 
energy and resources into a vaccine for Ebola and to fast-track its 
development, testing, and deployment. Our interest in these 
questions lingered after the workshop ended, and we decided to 
collaborate—along with Candice Welhausen, who studies data 
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visualizations of epidemics—to compose a piece that would capture 
our many voices in a discussion of rhetoric, Ebola, and vaccination. 
In the sections that follow, each author brings her specialized 
expertise to bear upon questions about the Ebola virus and the 
development of a vaccine. Our work is united by our interest in how 
vaccines and vaccination function rhetorically in discussions of 
outbreak response and disease prevention. More specifically, we are 
concerned with how vaccines respond literally and metaphorically 
to outbreaks; with what epistemologies, values, cultural practices, 
and material realities are revealed or concealed in calls to develop a 
new vaccine; and with how the development of a vaccine 
rhetorically reframes the disease it works to prevent. Our purpose 
in this work is not necessarily to make a unified argument about 
Ebola or an Ebola vaccine, but to capture multiple perspectives and 
generate ideas for scholars within and beyond our discipline to 
explore, discuss, and research further. In addition to a compilation 
of analyses on rhetoric and disease, this article functions, we hope, 
as an example of the kind of generative work the RSA Summer 
Institute workshops and seminars can produce. 
Candice Welhausen begins our conversation with her piece 
“Risk Perception and Data Visualizations in the Ebola Outbreak.” 
In it, she provides valuable background information and context for 
the piece by illustrating how visual and verbal representations of 
the outbreak evolved over time. She argues that although verbal 
messages shifted toward an emphasis on containment, visual 
messages continued to perpetuate an emphasis on contagion. 
Candice Welhausen concludes with a brief overview of the World 
Health Organization’s (WHO) decision to give its blessing to fast-
tracked vaccine trials. This discussion then leads into Heidi 
Lawrence: “Ebola, Foucault, and the Will-to-Vaccinate.” 
Citing Foucault’s work on inoculation in 18th and 19th-century 
France, Heidi Lawrence argues that calls to develop a vaccine 
rhetorically shift risk and blame away from economic, political, and 
social conditions that exacerbate the spread of disease, and toward 
individuals. Susan Popham focuses on the ethical implications of 
expediting clinical trials for the Ebola vaccine, using genre theory as 
a way of understanding vaccine research. She argues that the 
expedited process, while justified in the effort to prevent the spread 
of disease and save lives, may have ignored important stages in 
vaccine development—particularly the rhetorical processes involved 
in conducting and communicating this research. 
Jennifer Scott follows suit by focusing on implicit and explicit 
calls to develop a vaccine, examining how these calls took up 
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certain material conditions that exacerbated the outbreak while 
ignoring others. While a vaccine might be an effective way to stop 
Ebola outbreaks, she argues, it is unlikely to resolve most of the 
underlying socioeconomic conditions that exacerbated the 
outbreak—some of which are not unique to West Africa. 
Finally, Kristin Kondrlik explores the individuation of risk in the 
Ebola outbreak, as exemplified by the discourse about nurses Kaci 
Hickox, who was exposed to the disease in Sierra Leone, and Amber 
Vinson, who was infected while caring for the first patient 
diagnosed with Ebola in the United States. 
Candice A. Welhausen: Risk Perception and Data 
Visualizations in the Ebola Outbreak 
The Ebola outbreak that began in 2014 was first reported in late 
March of that year with 86 suspected cases in Guinea, 59 of which 
resulted in death (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
[CDC], 2015b). By early April, eight suspected cases had been 
reported in Liberia with additional cases in Sierra Leone in May, in 
Nigeria in July, and Senegal in August (CDC, 2015b; WHO, 2015). 
As cases began to be diagnosed outside of West Africa—one in 
Spain, four in the United States, one in the United Kingdom, and 
one in Italy—concern that the outbreak would develop into a global 
pandemic began to grow (CDC, 2015a). 
By the late summer and early fall of 2014, following extensive 
media coverage, the public response to the outbreak had intensified 
significantly, particularly in the United States and Europe (Higgins, 
2014). Travel advisories were issued for affected areas, infected 
healthcare workers were transported to their home countries for 
treatment, and several nurses became infected while treating 
patients in developed countries, prompting what Strong has 
described as “an epidemic of fear” (Strong, 1990, 251). This 
“epidemic psychology” describes the widespread anxiety that can 
emerge during an outbreak, and which was, in all likelihood, driven 
to a large extent by a news reporting strategy that attempted to 
move “from alarming to reassuring,” an approach, Ungar suggests, 
that often describes media coverage during “hot crises” (situations 
such as the 1995 Ebola outbreak in Zaire) (Ungar, 1998, 36). In 
other words, the media initially attempts to incite alarm in order to 
draw attention to a potential public health risk. After all, as 
Sandman puts it: “The possibility that X is dangerous...makes the 
story worth covering” (Sandman, 1994, 254). However, when risk 
perception is already high, as is often the case in crisis and 
emergency risk situations because the consequences of the threat 
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are potentially severe or catastrophic, this strategy can quickly 
create a heightened state of panic. Indeed, Kristin Kondrlik’s 
discussion of the treatment of Kaci Hickox, an American nurse who, 
having returned to the U.S. after working in Sierra Leone, tested 
negative for Ebola but was quarantined nonetheless, illustrates the 
real world consequences of the shift from alerting the public to 
causing a panic. 
Media coverage of the 2014 outbreak initially worked to spark 
public concern using a combined visual/verbal (language-based) 
communication strategy. For instance, during the summer of 2014, 
news reports describing the poor healthcare infrastructure in the 
affected countries and inadequate access to protective gear often 
included data visualizations—line graphs, maps, and bar charts—
showing rapidly increasing infection rates (an example: the 
coverage of the epidemic in the New York Times [NYT]). Yet while 
the language-based strategy shifted toward a message of 
containment—the “controlling metaphor of modern-day 
epidemiology”—as public reaction began to escalate, the visual 
message communicated through data visualizations continued to 
reinforce contagion (Welhausen, 2015, 274). For instance, the 
textual information in an article like “How many patients have been 
treated outside of Africa” created and published by the NYT (using 
data from WHO, CDC, Médecins Sans Frontières/Doctors Without 
Borders [MSF], and other organizations) uses an arguably 
straightforward question and answer format, which aligns in many 
ways with best practices in risk communication (Ashkenas et al., 
2015; see CDC, 2012). The report provides accurate, timely, and 
comprehensive details about the epidemic, outlining improvements 
in treatment in West Africa, actions being taken in U.S. hospitals to 
prevent the disease from spreading, and the status of new 
treatments being developed—to give a few examples. The section 
that discusses treatments also includes a link to another NYT article 
detailing “government plans to fast-track...a vaccine,” further 
reinforcing an overall verbal message of containment as well as 
advancing the promise of ‘real world’ action. However, as I have 
argued elsewhere, the visual message employed in several of the 
infographics in this article communicates the inverse of this verbal 
message, which served to increase risk perception among non-
expert viewers (that is, public audiences) in Western countries 
(Welhausen, in press). 
In early 2015 an NYT article entitled “Getting to zero Ebola 
cases” reported the decline of the epidemic while continuing to use 
many of the same visualizations strategies that I have previously 
identified (Lai, 2015). For instance, the graphics in this article use 
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the warm color red, which viewers in Western cultures often 
associate with danger or warning. This graphic also shows the 
spread of the epidemic from a collectivistic perspective—that is, 
from a point of view that visually places greater value on how the 
outbreak affects groups rather than individuals. By design, data 
visualizations construct temporal and/or spatial relationships 
among aggregate, quantitative information. Thus statistical 
graphics that show the progression of an epidemic exclusively focus 
on how the outbreak is affecting a group rather than individuals 
within a particular group. This population-based emphasis is 
foundational to a public health perspective. However, because non-
experts often assess risk from an individualistic perspective—that 
is, in terms of how a particular hazard might personally impact 
them—data visualizations may increase risk perception. Like “How 
Many Patients Have Been Treated...” the textual message in 
“Getting to Zero Ebola Cases” (which is also reinforced by the title) 
communicates containment, whereas the visual message 
communicated by the data visualizations contradicts the verbal 
message (Ashkenas et al., 2015; Lai, 2015). 
As of this writing in mid-October, 2015, Guinea (3,797 cases and 
2,532 deaths), Sierra Leone (13,811 cases and 3,955 deaths), and 
Liberia (10,672 cases and 4,808 deaths) are the hardest hit 
countries. Only 36 cases have been reported outside of West Africa 
(CDC, 2015a). Although media coverage has substantially decreased 
since late 2014 and early 2015, perhaps because of the apparent 
success of containment, widespread transmission continues in 
Guinea and Sierra Leone (CDC, 2015a). 
The unprecedented scale of this outbreak—the most severe since 
the disease was discovered in 1976—combined with intensive media 
coverage created a sense of urgency in the global health community, 
prompting the WHO to convene “a consultation to consider and 
assess the ethical implications for clinical decision-making of use of 
unregistered interventions that have shown promising results in the 
laboratory and in animal models but that have not yet been 
evaluated for safety and efficacy in humans” (WHO, 2014, 1). The 
panel’s task was to weigh the relative risks of allowing the outbreak 
to continue without new interventions, or to go ahead with 
interventions whose probability of success was uncertain. 
According to WHO’s report on the panel’s proceedings, “The panel 
agreed unanimously that, in the exceptional situation of the current 
Ebola outbreak, there is an ethical imperative to offer the available 
experimental interventions that have shown promising results in 
the laboratory and in relevant animal models to patients and people 
at high risk of developing the disease.” The report goes on to outline 
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a number of ethical criteria for deployment of these treatments, 
including insistence on transparency, informed consent, and sound 
data collection (WHO, 2014, 5). While the panel acknowledged that 
their recommendation was “a departure from the well-established, 
historically evolved system of regulation and governance of 
therapies and interventions,” they felt that the need to curb the 
outbreak merited such a departure (WHO, 2014, 1). This 
recommendation led to accelerated human trials of two vaccines, 
and leads us to Heidi Lawrence’s contribution: a discussion of the 
will-to-vaccinate. 
Heidi Y. Lawrence: Ebola, Foucault, and the Will-
to-Vaccinate 
The will-to-vaccinate came up early in our discussions at RSA’s 
2015 Summer Institute as we discussed the case of Ebola in relation 
to our central research interests in vaccination. We noted that, as 
we had watched the epidemic unfold through the media coverage, 
we had been surprised by how often the issue of vaccination came 
up—when we would have a vaccine? Why we didn’t have one 
already? What is the status of vaccine trials? How might an Ebola-
fearing public respond to a vaccine if one were available in the 
United States? We observed that, in discussions about contagious, 
communicable disease outbreaks generally, vaccination is often a 
source of discussion during media reports. Simple or serious, 
widespread or localized, novel or familiar, the questions are always 
the same: Is a vaccine available? If so, where can I get it? Why are 
enough people not getting it? And, if it is not available, why isn’t it 
developed or ready? 
This struck us as both expected and odd at the same time. 
Though vaccines are touted as undeniably safe, effective, and 
reliable by the medical and public health communities, with the 
majority of other scholars who study vaccine refusal in some form, 
we also know that vaccines are often resisted by vocal components 
of the public. Why is it, then, that, when faced with reports about an 
outbreak, we are so eager to talk about vaccines as a solution to the 
problems caused by disease when vaccines can often be a site of 
scrutiny, skepticism, and discord? Why is the will-to-vaccinate so 
engaging and so powerful? 
In my discussion, I will attempt to address these questions by 
turning to Michel Foucault’s discussion of disease and inoculation 
and by examining the inter-related roles that vaccination plays in 
mediating risk and responsibility, and thus security, in populations. 
I will then connect Foucault’s observations back to Ebola. 
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Foucault discusses inoculation and its relationship to 
population in the essay “Politics of Health in the Eighteenth 
Century” (in his book Power/Knowledge) and in Security, 
Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-
1978. According to these analyses, two historical conditions rise in 
18th and 19th century France that consequently construct 
vaccinations as important governmental objectives. 
First, is a growing connection between disease risk and security, 
whereby security becomes partially defined as the narrowing of 
risks of the consequences of disease. Foucault defines security as 
circulation—of goods, persons, materials, and even air within a 
population that is “safe” and that ensures the free exchange of 
commerce. He states: 
More precisely and particularly, freedom is nothing else 
but the correlative of the deployment of apparatuses of 
security. An apparatus of security...cannot operate well 
except on condition that it is given freedom, in the 
modern sense the word acquires in the eighteenth 
century: no longer the exemptions and privileges 
attached to a person, but the probably of movement, 
change of place, and processes of circulation of both 
people and things (Foucault, 2007, 48-49). 
Foucault argues that the most important historical event leading to 
understanding why inoculation practices were adopted and 
recommended in the late 18th and early 19th century is the rise in 
tabulation of population-level statistics and risk and their 
connections to apparatus of security. Foucault maintains that the 
development of population-wide data via public health and hospital 
systems allowed governments to track those who contracted small 
pox, died of it, or survived it. With this data, risk factors could be 
determined for who within a population caught and subsequently 
succumbed to small pox (Foucault, 2007, 60). From these numbers, 
Foucault argues that “normal” distributions were determined by 
connecting death rates to demographic characteristics (age, sex, 
etc.). Risk factors emerged in cases where the number of deaths 
resulting from small pox in any category exceeded the norm 
(Foucault, 2007, 62). The first major risk factor that emerged in 
small pox epidemiological data was “being under the age of 3.” 
Consequently, reducing death rates from small pox for children 
under the age of 3 was the first target for inoculation programs (and 
thus regulating the risk across age groups). Foucault argues in “The 
Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century,” locating disease risks 
among children meant situating responsibility for achieving 
security within families, which is the second condition contributing 
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to the rise in vaccination as a health imperative. In “Politics,” 
Foucault posits that, as apparatuses of security grow in the 18th 
century to control populations, the family becomes medicalized as 
the control of disease and pursuit of health objectives becomes its 
objective. He writes: 
The family is assigned a linking role between general 
objectives regarding the good health of the social body 
and individuals’ desire or need for care. This enables a 
“private” ethic of good health as the reciprocal duty of 
parents and children to be articulated on to a collective 
system of hygiene and scientific technique of cure made 
available to individual and family demand by a 
professional corps of doctors qualified and, as it were, 
recommended by the state (Foucault, 1980, 174). 
It is in this historical moment that larger objectives to prevent 
disease, and so ensure the security of the state from the restriction 
of circulation that epidemics may cause, become the responsibility 
of the family. Families, from this point forward, are not responsible 
for ensuring health just to maintain their own properties, blood 
lines, or happiness. Instead, they take on a new set of 
responsibilities to be hygienic, healthy, and disease-free for the sake 
of state objectives. 
Immunization is one of the key specific forms of responsibility 
that families take on at this time. Foucault points out that 
inoculation, and in particular the inoculation of children, becomes a 
family responsibility at just this time. Small pox variolation - a form 
of immunity production where pox scabs were scraped from one 
patient and rubbed into a wound in another, producing a mild form 
of disease and immunity to small pox - becomes popular and, in 
some cases, is mandated in the face of epidemics. Foucault writes, 
“The long campaign of inoculation and vaccination has its place in 
this movement to organize around the child a system of medical 
care for which the family is to bear the moral responsibility and at 
least part of the economic cost” (Foucault, 1980, 174). In this sense, 
vaccination becomes the mechanism through which state objectives 
to create security through disease control are enacted. In so doing, 
families are made to feel individually responsible for their “health,” 
which is just an individualized form of state security objectives. 
Vaccination shifts the nature and site of the disease risk from the 
state to individuals, making disease control a family responsibility. 
Within this view, the state’s responsibilities for epidemic control 
are enacted through the individual task—and risk—of vaccination. 
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In this sense, one of the contemporary effects of the will-to-
vaccinate in the Ebola epidemic does exactly what Foucault 
observes of inoculation practices in 18th century France. It takes on 
multi-national, global health objectives and situates the 
responsibility for them with individuals. 
This shift is significant in understanding how vaccination works 
as a rhetorical trope in the contemporary case of Ebola. Although 
the precise reason for this particular Ebola epidemic is unknown 
and a source of controversy, some maintain that its development 
was in part created or complicated by a number of economic and 
geopolitical factors. Deforestation and activities such as mining 
have led to increased contact between humans and bats, bringing 
Ebola to communities previously unaffected by the disease (McCoy, 
2014). Since Ebola is not common in the countries first affected by 
the 2014 outbreak and can be mistaken for other illnesses, early 
cases went undiagnosed. Existing health infrastructures in Guinea, 
Liberia, and Sierra Leone could not support the level and extent of 
care required for Ebola infection, further restricting care and 
creating higher rates of morbidity and mortality. The occurrence, 
size, and scope of the epidemic was enormously complicated, if not 
entirely created, by these structural factors. 
Given this analysis, calls for a vaccine and demands that it be 
produced quickly do exactly what Foucault observed with small pox 
epidemics in the 18th century. Were an Ebola vaccine available, it 
would become an individual responsibility to get the vaccine and 
prevent epidemics. Each person at risk must travel to wherever it is 
being administered, obtain any required boosters or follow-ups, 
and contend with the side effects or rare adverse events that might 
occur. Though preventing the epidemic through something as 
reliable as a vaccine is of course an undeniably good thing, focusing 
on it obscures the larger factors that created the problem to begin 
with. A global economic and infrastructural issue becomes an 
individual responsibility. 
A vaccine, in this sense, is not just a desirable solution because 
it can prevent disease. Nor is my point aimed at diminishing the 
power and importance of preventing outbreaks. But by applying 
Foucault’s observations to this situation we also see how 
vaccinations fundamentally change the nature of responsibility for 
disease. Economic and political factors that contribute to disease 
epidemiology can be elided by a new, personal, individual 
responsibility to get a vaccine. Any outbreaks that do happen are 
not the fault of larger conditions that create disease and prevent 
adequate health care, but instead are the fault of individuals who 
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cannot pay for a vaccination, are too negligent to get it, or are 
persuaded by perceived illogical concerns about vaccine safety. 
The lesson is that calls to create a vaccine are not normatively 
neutral. They can function structurally and rhetorically as ways of 
avoiding addressing the systemic problems that cause outbreaks. 
Moreover, although a vaccine might be a good thing in the end, and 
it certainly is a good thing if it prevents an epidemic from 
happening, it only works on one virus at a time. As Jennifer Scott 
explicates further in “Materiality and the Reframing of Ebola,” the 
structure needs to be addressed to keep the next virus from 
spreading, the next disease from tipping into epidemic, the next set 
of casualties from filling the news. 
Susan Popham: Genre Systems and Metaphoric 
Immunization 
Like thousands of other Americans, when I heard that the Ebola 
outbreak in western Africa had reached epidemic proportions, at 
least as reported by our local news agencies, I thought the outbreak 
could be managed simply by providing vaccination. I even thought 
that perhaps the vaccine had proven ineffective against this 
particular strain of the disease. At the very worst, I assumed that 
perhaps political machinations had kept the vaccine from reaching 
the citizens who most needed it, as often happens when politics 
impacts the distribution of important resources and medications. 
Imagine, then, my surprise in finding out that there was no Ebola 
vaccine ready to deploy. When I reflected on these assumptions and 
thoughts later as I listened and read more about the Ebola 
outbreak, I realized how much I, like thousands of other Americans, 
had come to rely and believe in the promise of modern, 
Westernized medicine—how much we assume that there is an 
instant and easy treatment for every disease, how often we turn to 
vaccines to prevent the spread of horrific diseases, and how firmly 
rooted is our belief that medicines are omnipresent—perfected and 
readily available even before we realize that we need them: what 
Heidi Lawrence has analyzed as the will-to-vaccinate. 
In reality, our system of modern medicine manufactures very 
few vaccines compared to the number of viruses and bacteria that 
sicken people every year. Further, when we divide the number of 
specific viruses into the number of possible future strains, we can 
readily perceive how the number of possible vaccines increases 
exponentially. What most Americans, even physicians and other 
health care-givers, often fail to realize is the time-consuming and 
resource-consuming process of the research, development, and 
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manufacturing needed to produce an effective vaccine. Literally, 
thousands of staff-hours, thousands of days, millions of dollars, 
thousands of pages of written documents, dozens of trials, dozens 
of layers of supervision and approval, and hundreds of ill patients 
are consumed in each case. Without all of these elements and 
resources, no vaccine is developed, let alone manufactured and 
distributed. Moreover, all of these elements must be in place before 
one can determine the efficacy and effectiveness of the vaccine. In 
other words, the vaccine must be researched and developed before 
we can start to study the effectiveness of its ability to prevent or 
treat a virus. 
According to the National Institutes of Health, the process of 
researching, developing, testing, and distributing a reliable vaccine 
involves five distinct phases. Phase zero, or preliminary trials 
conducted in laboratories, involve almost no interaction with 
people. In phase one, a new and untried vaccine is tested on 
humans in order to determine negative side-effects. In phase two, 
the effectiveness of specific levels of the vaccine are measured. In 
phase three, the vaccine is tested in different populations and in 
different contexts, for example in conjunction with other 
medications or illnesses; if the studies have been positive and the 
vaccine is not rejected or sent back for further laboratory testing, it 
will be sent to the FDA for approval. In the final phase, four, the 
vaccine continues to be tested for long-term side-effects, 
effectiveness in specific populations, and optimal use. Each of these 
phases involves thousands of hours of effort and likely millions of 
dollars. And, each phase involves thousands of pages of data, 
reports, forms, data entries, proposals, instructions, 
documentation, and scholarship. A fast-track process, like that 
approved by the WHO (described above by Candice Welhausen), 
seeks to acquire quick approval of its transition from phase one or 
two to a subsequent step by asking to have its approval moved to 
the top of the stack, past the approvals of developing drugs and 
vaccines with less immediacy. Such a process may also skip either 
phase two or more usually phase three, or combine both phases in a 
single trial. The lengthy and expensive phase process by which 
vaccinations are developed and proven serves the public as both a 
protective barrier, like a metaphoric immunization, through the 
coordination of the scientific genres of vaccination development. 
The genres by which these trials and studies are conducted form 
what Charles Bazerman, Carolyn Miller, Amy Devitt and other 
genre theorists have called a genre system: a body of many different 
genres that draw upon, build on, and manage the work of an 
organization. Members of an organization or community use these 
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genres in the aggregate, even the many different iterations of a 
single genre and the many different genres, to achieve their 
community’s or organization’s objectives. The genres of phase trials 
work together as a system, with discursive techniques such as 
intertextuality, incremental integration, abbreviation, and citation 
practices. This coordinated system of genres reports on the efficacy 
and effectiveness of the developing vaccine, while also seeking FDA 
approval for sales and distribution. In regard to vaccination 
development and testing, the genres perform much like Bruno 
Latour described in the scientific process of inscription: the 
scientific process, indeed the whole of scientific behavior, is based 
on inscribing—writing, drawing, charting, chronicling, 
enumerating, calculating, detailing, diagraming—the details of 
scientific observation and experimentation. Without the process of 
inscription, scientific work would cease (Latour, 1987). The process 
of inscription creates genres by which more scientific work can 
occur; one genre begets another. 
The genre system of vaccine development is evidence for what 
Dorothy Smith and Catherine Schryer term a documentary society 
(Smith and Schryer, 2013). They define such a society as that which 
both uses documents to create a community formed around these 
genres. The scientific community of immunologists, virologists, 
clinicians, care-givers, etc. all rely in some way on the inscription 
and genres of the work of vaccine development; through that use of 
genres and inscriptions in common to them and thus a growing 
familiarity with those genres, they form a common bond and loose 
community. Smith and Schryer also argue that a documentary 
society uses documents (i.e., genres) for governance and control. 
Communities within a documentary society create and use genres 
to laboriously document, report, standardize and archive the work 
of their members. In regard to vaccine development, the genres 
related to the laboratory work, the vaccination testing, and the FDA 
approval process govern and regulate the work of the scientists who 
are developing the vaccine. In short, within a documentary society, 
genres exist in a cycle of creation and use by and for people; 
documents are tools for completing work, specifically that of 
governing and regulating people, and these same documents 
mediate and create a community of the people who use them 
(Smith and Schryer, 2013). 
Perceiving vaccine development genres as an element of a 
documentary society allows us to analyze the regulatory function of 
the genre system. While it ostensibly works to progress the process 
of vaccine development and approval, for the FDA and for society 
as a whole these genres function as a sort of check-and-balance 
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against pseudoscience and poorly performed science. This genre 
system provides a type of protection against overly hasty drug 
development and fraudulent marketing. By writing in the genre 
system—documenting, reporting, filing, and archiving the results—
and by publishing the studies, researchers keep the focus of vaccine 
development on slow, laborious, steady scientific process rather 
than on the quick and much easier sale of a drug that might be no 
more effective than snake oil or as dangerous as snake venom. One 
might argue that the FDA is in itself a protective barrier between 
the public and science. Part of the role of the FDA, and in some 
respects those of the NIH, NSF, CDC, and WHO, is to serve a 
regulatory and protective function. It is the genres themselves, 
however, as read, reviewed, and sorted by the members of approval 
organizations, that allow researchers to make protective decisions 
for the American and world’s citizens. In this regard, the genre 
system is used by society and regulatory bodies such as the FDA, 
the NIH, the CDC, and the WHO to approve, reject, and govern the 
development and distribution of vaccines. These are “the 
documentary forms of governance” that Smith and Schryer posit as 
one element of a documentary society (Smith and Schryer, 2013). 
Yet there are many more genres produced in the development of 
a vaccine that are never read or sent to the FDA, but that also form 
an essential part of the genre system. These documents are used 
within laboratories and among researchers, distributors, caregivers 
who conduct the vaccinations and patients who are the subjects 
who receive the immunizations. These documents, the laboratory 
inscriptions that might never be a part of the approval documents 
sent to the FDA also work to protect laboratories, scientists, and 
researchers from reliance on too-human memories, overwhelming 
amounts of data, and sloppy methods. In this regard, the genre 
system reifies and helps to constitute the community of 
immunological science, a community of scientists oriented to 
similar texts and to the writing, reading, and interpretation of these 
texts. The process of writing during vaccine development helps to 
ensure scientists’ caution and objectivity, and helps to protect 
society from unscrupulous and error-ridden drug development. By 
filling the dual role of governance and community-reification noted 
in a documentary society, the genre system of vaccine development 
functions to protect society from falling prey to false claims of cures 
and prevention, in effect like a metaphorical vaccination protecting 
us from the dangers of pseudoscience. 
Against this background we can see clearly that by demanding 
fast-tracking of a vaccine, researchers and scientists are arguing 
that a portion of this protective layer be removed, that the benefits 
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hoped for in a fast-track approval and vaccine distribution 
outweigh suspected risks and that some of this protective process is 
in any case unnecessary. In effect, they argue that the end—a 
hoped-for effective vaccine against a dangerous contagious 
disease—justifies the means of by-passing some heretofore 
necessary scientific processes. The unspoken assumption is that 
some steps in the process are unnecessary and hinder the process of 
truly beneficial science. As a citizen and as rhetorician, I do not 
oppose the fast-tracking of a safe and effective vaccine to help 
protect those who live in Ebola-prone areas. I do recognize, 
however, the harm possible of removing or side-stepping part of 
our protective process of Phase trials, and I remain cautious and 
critical about the long-term benefits for all of humanity that can 
arise from an endeavor that seeks to dismantle some of the 
scientific process.  
I am even more critical of calls that propose fast-tracking or 
expediting drug deployment in order to benefit science rather than 
people, as Heymann, Rodier, and Ryan argued in an op/ed piece in 
the prestigious medical journal The Lancet early in 2015. “Time is 
of the essence because efficacy trials can only be completed while 
the Ebola virus continues to circulate.” And later, “There is urgency 
to complete these efforts [for implementing the efficacy trials] 
because Ebola incidence is decreasing as countries place more 
emphasis on surveillance and contact tracing and as communities 
build a better understanding of how to prevent transmission” 
(Heymann, Rodier, and Ryan, 2015, 1913). I hope that these 
scientists are urging quick testing of the available trial vaccines in 
order to ease the current suffering of Ebola patients. However, their 
words suggest that the benefit would come from the knowledge 
gained in the study, rather than benefitting patients. Surely, a 
decrease in Ebola cases is undoubtedly a good thing, as is 
preventing the transmission of the disease through better 
education. These researchers, however, argue that we should 
intensify the process of developing a vaccine through its trial phases 
because such a disease decrease is occurring, and fewer people are 
contracting Ebola. I understand that, as Jennifer Scott discusses 
below, the scientific trials need the disease in situ in order to study 
the effectiveness of the vaccine. However, I oppose expediting a 
vaccine and its phase trials in order to benefit the scientific system, 
especially when such science ignores or elides the decrease in 
human suffering offered by existing means of improved education 
and surveillance. If vaccinations, by virtue of simplicity, ease, and 
isolation, have become the intervention of choice by contemporary 
society, fast-tracking and skipping over parts of the genre 
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system/scientific inscription process should not also become the 
default process of developing those vaccines. Ease and efficiency 
are not always better. If the disease can be managed through 
existing means, perhaps we do not need vaccination as desperately 
as we first assumed, and perhaps not desperately enough, in any 
case, to skip over parts of the cautious and protective of phase trials 
and their attendant genre systems. Attention to the material 
conditions of disease transmission is just as important as, if not 
more important than, attention to vaccines as the default 
intervention. 
Jennifer Scott: Materiality and the Rhetorical 
Framing of Ebola 
As Susan Popham has mentioned at the end of the previous section, 
in our dialogue, it is important for us to bear in mind that a virus 
alone does not make an outbreak, even a virus as devastating as 
Ebola. Ebola virus is transmitted when an uninfected human or 
animal comes into contact with the bodily fluids of an infected 
human or animal. It is important, therefore, that we consider how 
material conditions and social constructions put humans in contact 
with one another and how conditions such as gender and racial 
inequities combine with limited access to healthcare to enable the 
spread of disease. Because of this interplay between rhetoric, 
culture, and material realities of people’s lives, I am interested in 
how the material conditions of the 2014 outbreak have and have 
not been made “present,” to use Chaïm Perelman’s term, in 
discourses about Ebola and calls to expedite vaccine development 
(Perelman, 1969, 118). In this section, I’ll address which of these 
material conditions are foregrounded and which are subsumed in 
arguments for fast-tracking Ebola vaccine development. 
The material conditions of outbreaks play an important role in 
discourses about the Ebola vaccine. Although calls for an Ebola 
vaccine have been more frequent and persistent in this outbreak 
than in previous ones, these vaccines have been in development for 
some time. For example, a 2007 article in the journal Vaccine 
discusses at length the efforts and challenges of developing vaccines 
for Ebola and Marburg (Reed and Mohamadzadeh, 2007). Some 
writers argue that the material conditions of previous Ebola 
outbreaks have hindered the development of vaccines. Helen 
Branswell of Scientific American, for example, notes that prior to 
the 2014 epidemic, “Outbreaks were too small (typically fewer than 
100 people) and too short-lived (less than five months) to give 
researchers the chance to test potential therapies. By the time they 
could have put a clinical trial in place, the threat would have 
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passed” (Branswell, 2015). Furthermore, the small scale and brevity 
of epidemics created little financial incentive for pharmaceutical 
companies to develop a vaccine; after all, until 2014, Ebola “had 
taken 40 years to dispatch its first 1,600 victims”—hardly a profit 
generator (Branswell, 2015). In essence, the material conditions of 
disease outbreaks and transmission have hindered past efforts to 
develop a vaccine. 
Citing these limitations of past outbreaks, some authors present 
the 2014 outbreak as a kind of kairotic moment for vaccine 
researchers—a disturbing notion, albeit a pragmatic one. Because 
Ebola outbreaks are relatively rare and relatively small, many 
authors cite the scale and longevity of this particular outbreak as a 
rationale for deploying experimental treatments, including vaccines 
(Branswell, 2015; Galvani et al., 2014). For example, Branswell 
writes this of the 2014 outbreak: “For the first time ever, scientists 
had an Ebola outbreak large enough and long enough to allow 
intensive clinical trials aimed at finding better treatments, one that 
might be impossible to stop without developing vaccines and new 
drugs” (Branswell, 2015). The latter portion of this statement—that 
the outbreak may be “impossible to stop” without experimental 
treatments—constructs the disease as relentless, appealing to 
readers’ fears. An editorial in the Annals of Internal Medicine also 
noted the kairotic opportunity presented by the outbreak, stating 
that “the emergency deployment of an Ebola vaccine may also serve 
as a source of data that could be used to further demonstrate 
efficacy and waning properties that are fundamental to informing 
preparedness strategies to prevent future outbreaks” (Galvani et al., 
2014, 749). Galvani et al. also point to the risk to healthcare 
workers as a rationale to expedite vaccine development, explaining 
that, “The safety risks of vaccines, particularly those found to be 
safe in phase 1 clinical trials, are probably negligible compared with 
the risks faced by health care workers in communities where the 
highly virulent Ebola virus is currently circulating” (Galvani et al., 
2014, 749). See Kristin Kondrlik’s expanding on of this point in a 
later section. 
As a rhetorician, I share Susan Popham’s concern that while an 
Ebola vaccine might stop Ebola, it may not effectively prevent the 
next epidemic in the region. By focusing on this particular virus as 
the most important factor in the outbreak, calls for a vaccine 
“flatten” Ebola into a singular problem with a singular cause. While 
it is true that we would not have an Ebola outbreak without Ebola 
virus, it bears repeating that a virus alone does not make an 
outbreak. A virus infects and sickens individuals, but social and 
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cultural norms create material conditions that transform a single 
infection into an epidemic. 
Mainstream news media have sometimes drawn attention to the 
role of culture and social norms in shaping the trajectory of the 
disease, but their attention usually seems focused on practices and 
social conditions that differ from norms in the United States and 
Western Europe. Often mentioned is the common West African 
practice of washing a deceased person’s corpse prior to burial, 
which, of course, can expose family members to bodily fluids and 
spread infection (Branswell, 2015; Nielsen et al., 2015). Much less 
frequently discussed is the fact that African women are more likely 
to be exposed to and infected by Ebola virus. Ndana Bofu-Tawamba 
calls this phenomenon “the feminization of epidemics,” pointing to 
the disproportionate effects of diseases such as Ebola and 
HIV/AIDS upon women (Bofu-Tawamba, 2014). She notes, for 
example, “Women account for 55 to 60 percent of the deceased in 
the current epidemic, according to UNICEF. The percentage of 
female victims in Liberia stands at 75 percent” (Bofu-Tawamba, 
2014). This imbalance in infection rates is largely due to cultural 
expectations: In West Africa, as in other patriarchal cultures, 
women are expected to be caregivers, tending to the sick, dying, and 
dead far more frequently than men. They are therefore exposed to 
the virus more frequently. Even within the healthcare community, 
cultural expectations shape these practices. Speaking of research 
conducted by her organization, Urgent Action Fund-Africa, Bofu-
Tawamba explains, “our assessment found that male doctors often 
left the most infectious tasks to female nurses to handle, such as 
cleaning patients’ vomit, blood, and urine” (Bofu-Tawamba, 2014). 
Ebola has no inherent preference for female victims, yet cultural 
norms shape the material realities of women’s lives in such a way 
that it is virtually guaranteed they will suffer disproportionately 
from infectious disease. 
This gender disparity in caregiving and therefore in infection 
rates does not seem to garner much attention from mainstream 
news media in the United States. While practices such as washing 
the dead are, in Perelman’s terms, made present in the discourse, 
practices common across our cultures are subsumed (Perelman, 
1969, 118). Were we to draw attention to gender disparities in 
caregiving and infection rates, we might be required to examine 
how our own patriarchal culture dictates norms that could harm 
women: after all, the U.S. Census Bureau reports that “In 2011, 9 
percent of all nurses were men while 91 percent were women” (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2013, 2). As far as cultural practices go, corpse 
washing is a far more culturally specific problem for disease control 
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than patriarchy, so perhaps it seems easier to address—or, perhaps, 
we are reluctant to critique a cultural norm that Americans share 
with West Africans, preferring to focus on differences that make our 
culture seem less vulnerable to the risk of disease. 
When attention is drawn to the material conditions of 
healthcare in West Africa, often the focus is not on conditions that 
exacerbated the outbreak, but on conditions resulting from it. 
Branswell notes that Ebola’s massive toll on the healthcare systems 
of West African nations could open the door to outbreaks of other 
contagious diseases (Branswell, 2015). Reporting for the NYT, 
Gladstone writes, “The births of more than 70,000 children in 
Liberia during the Ebola crisis were never recorded, leaving them 
vulnerable to marginalization as noncitizens, denial of government 
services, trafficking and illegal adoption…Quoting Ministry of 
Health data, UNICEF said the births of only 700 children had been 
registered between January and May of this year, when many 
health facilities were overwhelmed or closed” (Gladstone, 2015). 
Grady explains that many survivors of Ebola infection endure long-
term physical and psychological effects, ranging from blindness and 
joint pain to post-traumatic stress disorder (Grady, 2015). Such 
arguments frame these issues as mere aftermath of the epidemic, 
but many of the long-term problems that West Africans face in the 
wake of the Ebola outbreak existed long before it began. Take the 
example of access to healthcare: According to the Central 
Intelligence Agency’s World Factbook, in 2008 Liberia had only 
0.01 doctors available per 1000 people—or 1 doctor per 100,000 
people. In comparison, in 2011 the United States had 2.45 doctors 
per 1000 people, or 245 doctors per 100,000 people (Central 
Intelligence Agency, n.d.). 
An Ebola vaccine may indeed prevent the next outbreak of that 
particular disease, but in citing a vaccine as the best or only 
solution to a current outbreak, we may preclude other solutions 
that have good social consequences and would assist in the control 
and prevention of other outbreaks as well. As Galvani et al. write in 
their Annals of Internal Medicine editorial, “Vaccination alone is 
no panacea. Cultural and socioeconomic factors and suspicion of 
Western medical approaches complicate all medical interventions” 
(Galvani et al, 2014, 749–750). Examining the discourse about and 
around outbreaks from a rhetorical standpoint helps to question 
what and who is present in or absent from it. It helps to un-flatten 
that discourse and reveal the numerous complicating factors that 
contribute to outbreaks. 
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Kristin E. Kondrlik: Ebola and the 
Individualization of Risk 
As Candice Welhausen and Jennifer Scott have discussed above, the 
deadly results of the 2014 Ebola outbreak led government officials 
and public health advocates to call for increased speed in testing 
and distributing a vaccine (Fleck and Lesher, 2015; Chowell and 
Viboud, 2015). Despite their advocacy, some in the medical 
community have expressed concern about framing vaccines as a 
panacea for Ebola’s devastating effects. Editorials in the British 
Medical Journal and Nature have argued that the focus on 
experimental treatments and vaccines during the 2014 epidemic 
distracted from effective and ethical implementation of already-
proven prevention methods (Gericke, 2015; “Ebola: Time to Act,” 
2014). Other writers have reiterated the pressures placed on 
medical professionals to participate in untested prevention 
procedures. As Susan Popham notes, rhetors have noted the 
necessity of attending to the health risks to healthcare workers 
posed by expedited clinical trials of vaccines. In addition to physical 
risks, the epidemic nature of Ebola imposes pressure on medical 
professionals’ rhetorical agency. It challenges their ability to speak 
out when faced with the implementation of new and untested 
prevention procedures. We have already seen evidence of such 
pressure in the containment of the 2014 outbreak. But Kaci Hickox 
and Amber Vinson’s experiences are especially illustrative of the 
challenges to medical professionals’ bodily and rhetorical agency 
when government and public health officials are confronted with 
the risk of epidemic disease. 
The compromised bodily and rhetorical agency of medical 
professionals during an epidemic results in part from their 
increased association with what Talcott Parsons has termed a “sick 
role.” Typically, Parsons argues, a person who has been labeled 
“sick” has both rights, which include their exemption from normal 
social roles and from responsibility for their condition, and 
obligations, which include an imperative to get well and to seek care 
from a competent professional (Parsons, 1951). More recently, 
Pearce and Pickard have connected diagnosis to a shift in an 
individual’s agency—a transition from a “responsible agent” into a 
“passive victim of disease” (Pearce and Pickard, 2010, 831). I would 
add that this compromised agency in the “sick role” also results 
from an individual’s assumed obligations to their community. Both 
Hickox and Vinson were placed into “sick roles” as a result of their 
proximity to Ebola, and afterwards experienced compromised 
agency due to public pressures. 
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After arriving in the United States from Sierra Leone, Hickox, a 
nurse, presented with a slightly elevated temperature. It later would 
be attributed to stress at lengthy intake procedures (Miles, 2015, 
17). After this test, officials declared Hickox to have symptoms of 
Ebola and moved her into quarantine (Miles, 2015). Hickox’s 
potentially infected body became subject to increased containment 
procedures, despite the fact that she quickly tested negative for 
Ebola and showed no other symptoms (Robbins, Barbaro and 
Santora, 2014). Hickox was dubbed “the Ebola nurse” in the press 
in the days and weeks following her initial quarantine (Moyer, 
2014; Lerner, 2015; Bukaty, 2014). Public officials declared her 
“obviously sick” (Robbins, Barbaro and Santora, 2014). In addition 
to her physical restriction through quarantine, Hickox’s rhetorical 
agency was also limited. She could not effectively advocate against 
her participation in containment procedures or her classification as 
“sick.” In an article for the Guardian a few weeks after her 
quarantine, Hickox begged, “I never had Ebola, so please stop 
calling me ‘the Ebola Nurse’—now!” (Hickox, 2014b). Protest as she 
might, Hickox’s classification as “sick” by the public and 
government officials demanded that she behave as though she were 
a risk to others and that she conform to quarantine, even after she 
had been declared medically healthy (Nemitz, 2014). Her 
quarantine was later overturned in a district court decision, but 
under public and legal pressure Hickox agreed to voluntary 
monitoring for twenty-one days, the incubation period for Ebola 
(Nemitz, 2014). Rather than feeling that she had the opportunity to 
advocate on behalf of her own health decisions, Hickox maintained 
throughout the ordeal that she felt like a criminal or a prisoner, 
experiencing blame for perpetuating a risk to others, although she 
never contracted Ebola (Hickox, 2014a). 
Conforming to one’s sick role once an illness has been 
diagnosed, however, does not mean that medical professionals 
escape blame for deviating from the obligations of the sick role 
before its diagnosis. Nurse Amber Vinson, who treated the first 
person diagnosed with Ebola in the United States, did not behave as 
though she was “sick” after her exposure to the disease. Rather, she 
travelled to Ohio to plan her wedding. She had cleared her plans 
with the CDC both before and after her flight. When she travelled, 
no travel bans had yet been imposed by public health officials 
(Timm, 2014). After she began to exhibit symptoms of Ebola, 
however, Vinson flew home to Dallas and was lambasted by critics 
for her decision to travel. Many termed her actions “reckless” 
(Blinder, 2014; Timm, 2014). Although Vinson had behaved 
according to existing containment standards, her critics suggested 
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that, after her exposure to the disease, behaving as though she was 
not “sick” was “reckless” and irresponsible. 
As we have seen in the case of both Hickox and Vinson, the 
Ebola epidemic has increased pressure on medical professionals to 
adopt the obligations of a “sick role”—including reduced bodily and 
rhetorical agency—after exposure, even if they never develop 
symptoms of the disease. Although containment and prevention 
occur at different phases in the life of an epidemic, both make 
demands on medical professionals that may compromise their 
rhetorical agency in conversations about epidemic illness. Where 
containment procedures during an epidemic ask medical 
professionals to adopt the obligations associated with a sick role, 
vaccination asks medical professionals to actively inject a pathogen 
into their bodies—to make an alteration to their body in order to 
prevent the spread of illness. 
The discovery of an Ebola vaccine will do essential work in its 
prevention. Such a discovery, however, will only further complicate 
the relationship between prevention, medical professionals’ agency, 
and their identities. The pressure for medical professionals to be 
vaccinated under expedited vaccine development would further 
challenge medical professionals’ rhetorical agency, already 
compromised by public assumptions about their health identities 
and the obligations imposed by those health identities. Not only do 
public health advocates and government officials, therefore, need to 
attend to the dangers of these vaccines for medical professionals’ 
bodies. They also need to weigh the pressures imposed by epidemic 
disease on the voices of medical professionals in the conversations 
about prevention measures. 
Conclusion: An Invitation to Further Inquiry 
As rhetoricians interested in medicine generally and vaccination 
specifically, we recognize that calls to expedite the development of 
an Ebola vaccine reflect the many complexities of communicating 
about health and healthcare. In this essay, we have raised questions 
about those complexities and have suggested ways in which the 
study of rhetoric might assist in developing effective outbreak 
prevention and response. The analyses presented here suggest that 
the rhetorical construction of disease and related response is a 
precarious enterprise in which blame is often shifted away from the 
powerful and privileged toward the vulnerable and disadvantaged. 
Although an Ebola vaccine may prevent or lessen the impact of 
future outbreaks, we should be careful not to see it as a catch-all 
solution. We should continue to inquire into the rhetorical 
processes through which health and illness are constructed with the 
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end of creating more humane, responsive, and ethical medical and 
communicative interventions. 
Copyright © 2015 Jennifer L. Scott, Kristin E. Kondrlik, Heidi Y. 
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